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Detention of Private Persons by Private Persons as a 
Delictual Wrong: Liability for Deprivation of Liberty in 
Scots Private Law 
By Dr. Jonathan Brown 
|Preamble| 
 
| Jonathan Brown is a lecturer in Scots Private Law at the University of Strathclyde 
in Glasgow. Previously he was a lecturer in law at Aberdeen’s Robert Gordon 
University. Jonathan considers himself to be a private law generalist and dabbling 
legal historian. His recent publications include work on medical jurisprudence, the 
law of defamation and the relation between the Roman law of slavery and modern 
Scottish human trafficking legislation. The present essay is intended to provide a 
modern account which places acts amounting to wrongful detention effected by 
private persons within the taxonomy of iniuria. | 
 
Introduction 
‘False imprisonment’ is, in English law, a strict liability tort.1 It is thus 
actionable regardless of the mind-state of the perpetrator,2 regardless of 
whether or not the victim suffers any demonstrable ‘loss’ or ‘damage’3 and 
indeed regardless of whether or not the ‘victim’ knew that they had in fact been 
falsely imprisoned.4 To adopt the English lawyer’s term of art, the tort is 
actionable ‘per se’.5 In general terms, conduct amounts to ‘false imprisonment’ 
if the perpetrator has imposed some constraint on the freedom of movement 
from a particular place ordinarily enjoyed by another individual.6 
Conceptually, ‘false imprisonment’ falls, as a ‘cause of action’, under the 
umbrella of the ‘form of action’ known as ‘trespass to the person’,7 albeit 
unhappily so in the view of some learned authority.8 While it has been said that 
the ‘categorisation of trespasses to the person is an ongoing source of 
 
1 Regina v. Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Brockhill Ex Parte Evans [2001] 2 A.C. 19, at 26 per Lord 
Slynn 
2 Although this proposition is now complicated by the fact that the courts require the act amounting to 
physical imprisonment to have been ‘intentional’ – see Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2012] 1 AC 245, per Lord Dyson JSC at para.65 
3 Ibid., para.64 
4 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692, at 703a-c per Lord Griffiths  
5 Lumba, para.63 
6 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, at 1177 per Goff LJ 
7 Mulheron, Tort Law, p.685 
8 Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ. 2081, per Buxton LJ at para.68 
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confusion’,9 it remains the case that ‘the distinction [between actions of 
trespass and actions on the case] still continues to hold good’.10 England may 
have buried her forms of action, but, to this day, those forms do continue to 
exercise an influence over Common law jurisprudence.   
Scotland is not, in spite of its historical and ongoing political union with 
England, a Common law jurisdiction.11 Indeed, Scots law knows of no ‘torticle’ 
by the name of ‘false imprisonment’.12 In Scotland, ‘trespass’ refers only to 
‘transient interference with another person’s land [or sufficiently large 
moveable, such as a ship]13 without right to do so’.14 The phrase ‘trespass to a 
chattel’ has been described as being ‘perfectly unmeaning’ by the Scottish 
courts15 and the concept of ‘trespass to the person’ is likewise foreign to lawyers 
north of the Tweed.16 This is not to say that Scots law does not afford protection 
to individual liberty in private law. Rather, it is simply the case that the 
juridical history of the protection of ‘personality rights’ in Scotland differs 
quite drastically from the schema which has developed in the Common law 
world.17  
‘Affronts to liberty’ were termed by Stair ‘the most bitter and atrocious 
forms of injury’.18 The word ‘injury’, here, appears as a term of art and does not 
simply denote (as it typically does today) bodily harm suffered by a legal 
subject. Rather, it refers to what MacKenzie termed, in his 17th century opus 
on Matters Criminal,19 ‘contumely or reproach’.20 This usage was common to 
Civilian jurisdictions in the Seventeenth century21 and at this time (though not 
 
9 Mulheron, Principles, p.685 
10 Ibid., p.686 
11 See the Hon. Lord Gill, Quo Vadis Leges Romanorum?, passim. 
12 Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.160 
13 See Whitty, Rights of Personality, p.215 
14 Anderson, Property, para.10.18 
15 Leitch & Co v Leydon 1931 SC (HL) 1 at 8 
16 Whitty, Rights of Personality, p.215 
17 For the history of ‘personality rights’ in Scotland, see Blackie, Unity in Diversity, passim. For comment 
on the wider ius commune, see Blackie, Doctrinal History, passim. 
18 Stair, Inst., 1, 2, 2 
19 On the significance of the equivalence of crime and delict during this period of Scots law, see Blackie 
and Chalmers, Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime, p.286 
20 MacKenzie, Matters Criminal, (1678), p.303 
21 Blackie, Doctrinal History, p.14 
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immune to influence from south of the border)22 Scotland was unquestionably 
a part of the wider European legal family and subject only to limited Common 
law influence.23 Thus, it is apparent that the term ‘injury’ here corresponds 
with the Roman idea of iniuria within the context of the actio iniuriarum.24 
This is significant: Due to the significance of the Scottish ‘institutional 
writers’,25 it remains the case today that ‘interference with the personal liberty 
of an individual which is not warranted by law will justify an actio iniuriarum 
for solatium’.26  
The ‘legal ancestor’ of the Scottish action(s) for deprivation of liberty, in 
the context of private law and outwith the context of actions involving public 
authorities,27 is therefore markedly distinct from that of the English concept of 
‘false imprisonment’.28 This has a number of practical, as well as conceptual, 
implications. The purpose of this essay is to explore those implications through 
reference to the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic and the associated lock-
down(s) implemented to mitigate its effects. The facts arising from the 
localised lock-down imposed at Manchester Metropolitan University provide 
a useful case study; here, approximately fifteen-hundred students were sent an 
email by the University asking them to self-isolate for fourteen days to inhibit 
the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Many students later reported that they only 
became aware of the situation after security guards actively prevented them 
from leaving their halls of residence. In the immediate aftermath of this event, 
there have been reports that some students are considering legal action and 
seeking to raise claims of ‘false imprisonment’ against the institution.29 
This essay consequently explores the possibility of factually analogous 
claims succeeding in Scotland (not a mere matter of fancy, given reports of 
 
22 Blackie, Unity in Diversity, p.104 
23 At least insofar as the substantive law is concerned: Sellar,  A Tale of Two Receptions, passim. 
24 MacKenzie divides the classification of ‘injuries’ into those which are ‘real’ and those which are ‘verbal’, 
consistent with D.47.10.1.1 (Ulpian, citing Labeo) and later Civilian jurisprudence: See MacKenzie, 
Matters Criminal, Tit. XXX, I (p.304) 
25 Of which, see Paton, Evaluation of the Institutions, p.201 
26 Walker, Delict, p.681 
27 See Reid, Personality, paras.5.02-5.03 
28 English common law knows of no analogue to the actio iniuriarum: Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria, 
p.2 
29 Speare-Cole, Manchester Students Under Lockdown, passim. 
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comparable situations in this jurisdiction),30 with specific reference to the 
doctrinal differences between the English law of ‘false imprisonment’ and the 
Scots law of delict pertaining to deprivation of liberty effected by private 
persons (as opposed to state officials).31 In so doing, the essay seeks to fit the 
Scots action(s) for the redress of affronts to ‘personal liberty’ within the wider 
schema of the law of delictual liability. This, it is submitted, is necessary not 
only to ensure the coherence of the legal system as a whole, but also to ensure 
that actions to recover compensation for deprivation of liberty are understood 
by the legal profession and wider public alike. In the absence of such 
understanding, injustice may arise from the success of unmeritorious claims, 
from the failure of logically meritorious claims, or indeed from the failure to 
raise potentially successful claims in the first place.  
‘Liberty’ as an aspect of Corpus and the Actio Iniuriarum  
 ‘Actio injuriarum afforded a strong and efficient protection against 
injuries to immaterial interests … [it] was adopted from the Romans in order 
to provide protection against interference with man’s (non-material interest) 
in his dignity and honour’.32 Iniuria in the sense of the actio iniuriarum did 
not simply mean ‘wrongdoing’ in the broadest sense of that term,33 rather it 
denoted hubristic conduct34 which infringed another person’s recognised non-
patrimonial (i.e., ‘dignitary’)35 interest(s).36 It was – and is – thus conceptually 
distinct from actions to repair ‘loss’ [damnum] that have as their ancestor the 
 
30 Brooks and Adams, Banned from Socialising, passim.  
31 Interactions between state officials (such as police officers) and private individuals have been described 
as ‘paradigm case[s]’ of wrongful invasion of ‘liberty’ as a protected interest and there is a considerable 
body of Scots authority (based on the Act Anent Wrongous Imprisonment 1701) on this topic – of which, 
see Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.160; Reid, Malice and Police Privilege, passim. This essay, however, 
is focused on less paradigm cases; those which arise where a private individual, with no express state 
authority (in the form of public legislation permitting the conduct), acts to infringe the liberty interests 
of another private individual.   
32 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p.1062 
33 Although that was the word’s original meaning: Birks, The Early History of Iniuria, , p.163 
34 Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, p.40 
35 Whitty and Zimmermann, Issues and Options, p.3 
36 ‘At a high level of generality, it would probably not be controversial to say that all iniuriae were offences 
against dignity in the broad sense of status or honour (dignitas)’: Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria, 
p.13. Although Descheemaeker and Scott here identify dignitas with ‘status or honour’, there is a case to 
be made that existimatio would be the more fitting (in legal, not merely semantic) term to describe the 
highest-level dignitary interest protected by the actio iniuriarum, with dignitas operating functionally 
as a lower-level catch-all sub-category for personality interests which have not been singled out for 
specific protection.  
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lex Aquila.37 There, iniuria could be demonstrated by pointing to the 
defender’s culpa,38 but to succeed in an actio iniuriarum a pursuer would need 
to demonstrate that the defender had behaved contumeliously.39 Should this 
be proven alongside affront to a recognised ‘personality interest’, however, the 
defender would be obliged to make reparation, even if the pursuer did not 
suffer any pecuniary ‘loss’.40  
Within Roman law, all iniuriae, in the sense of the nominate delict, were 
said to pertain to a person’s corpus [body], fama [reputation] or dignitas 
[dignity].41 This triad was co-opted and popularised throughout the ius 
commune by Johannes Voet,42 to the extent that Blackie termed corpus, fama 
and dignitas ‘higher level categories… that are central in the general analysis 
of the more systematic jurists’.43 Although affronts to each of these three 
interests are each actionable as iniuria, ‘the protection in the Scots law of delict 
of a person’s interest in his or her bodily integrity and physical freedom [taken 
together under the higher-level heading of corpus]44 from the early modern 
period on has been in different ways separated from the protection of other 
specific interests relating to the person’.45 This has had the net effect of 
obscuring the place of iniuria within the framework of Scots law.46 Unlike in 
South Africa, where iniuria clearly stands alongside the lex Aquilia and the 
‘action for pain and suffering’ as one of the ‘three pillars’ of that jurisdiction’s 
 
37 Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria, p.2 
38 Ibbetson, Buckland on the Lex Aquilia, p.53; G.3.202; D.9.2.44pr. (Ulpian) 
39 Though certain texts, e.g., D.47.10.33 (Paul) appear to suggest that Roman law required conduct to be 
effected adversus bonus mores and for there have to been contumelia on the part of the defender, it is 
‘more likely… that for Ulpian the impropriety of the [defender’s] conduct was bundled up in his notion 
of contumelia, whereas for Paul the two requirements were treated as independent of one another, 
contumelia focusing on the subjective aspect of the [defender’s] conduct and adversus bonus mores 
focusing on its social interpretation’: Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, p.43 
40 See, e.g., D.47.10.9.1 (Ulpian); the irrelevance of pecuniary ‘loss’ remains a feature of the modern Scots 
actio iniuriarum: Walker, Delict, p.40 
41 Dig.47.10.1.2 (Ulpian) 
42 Johannes Voet (1647-1713) was a Dutch jurist and the son of Paul Voet (1619-1677), who was also a 
jurist. Johannes Voet was the author of, inter alia, an authoritative Commentary on the Pandects: see 
Voet, Commentarius, 47.10.1 
43 Blackie, Doctrinal History, p.2 
44 See Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.156 
45 Ibid., p.155 
46 This state of affairs was not unique to Scotland: ‘corpus was, in many ways, a victim of its own strength 
as a legally protected interest’ throughout the jurisdictions of the ius commune. ‘Its violation is so 
intuitively wrongful that it hardly needs to be channelled through the – a highly artificial – construct of 
iniuria for a remedy to be granted’ – see Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, p.15 
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law of delict,47 in Scotland the traditional view has long been that the law of 
delictual liability ‘is founded upon a [unitary] concept of [broad] culpa’.48 This 
concept of culpa is typically said to be derived from the lex Aquilia, although 
in contradistinction to the position in Roman law ‘the word culpa in this [i.e., 
the Scots] context had a wide sense and expresses a liability for dolus and culpa 
in a narrow sense’.49 
This view of the Scots law of delict as predicated entirely on culpa has 
fallen out of fashion. It emerged in the Nineteenth century and has since been 
invoked ‘in cases where there has been a doubt as to the basis of liability’.50 
Nonetheless, it has been said by two of leading lights of Scots law51 that ‘it [is] 
no longer possible to argue that the law was based on one general underlying 
principle such as reparation for culpa or fault… different interests [are] 
protected in different ways often far removed from personal injuries cases 
which have hitherto been considered paradigmatic’.52 This sage statement has 
the benefit of appearing as a statement of the obvious, if only in hindsight.53 
Rather than basing the sum of liability on one singular principle, Scots law has 
historically recognised a basic grammar of Aquilian liability and liability based 
on iniuria,54 with some native nominate delicts (such as assythment) serving 
to redress harm effected to the health, limbs and life of oneself and one’s 
family.55 
In recognition of the fact that it cannot now be said that Scots law is 
predicated on a single principle, it is submitted that there is an impetus for 
Scots lawyers to return to the recognition of the place of the actio iniuriarum 
within the law of delict. The actio iniuriarum is acknowledged as an important 
‘legal ancestor’ in many modern European jurisdictions,56 although the process 
 
47 Brown, Revenge Porn and the Actio Iniuriarum, p.403 
48 MacCormick, Culpa, p.13 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p.28 
51 The late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry and the late Professor Joe Thomson. 
52 Thomson, Delict, preface. 
53 It is a gift few possess, to state the obvious in such a way that the obvious only seems obvious after it 
has been stated.  
54 Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.156 
55 See Black, Delictual Liability in Scotland for Personal Injuries and Death, p.53 
56 Reid, Personality, para.17.18 
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of codification has, in most European jurisdictions, severed the direct 
influence of Roman law as a ‘living’ source.57 Scotland, like South Africa, is 
however (in a sense) a ‘living system of Roman law’, untouched by 
codification.58 Hence, iniuria subsists in this jurisdiction not only as a ‘legal 
ancestor’, but as the prime source of liability in contemporary delictual actions 
for assault59 (including sexual assault and rape),60 and (presently) 
defamation.61 Indeed, in any action which seeks recovery of solatium in the 
absence of proof of damnum, the claim is logically predicated on an actio 
iniuriarum.62 
While the ongoing relevance of the actio iniuriarum to modern Scots 
law has been questioned,63 it is here submitted that development of the 
concept is preferable to the available alternatives. In the absence of native 
authority on any given subject, modern Scots practitioners tend to look to 
English (or other Common law) precedents,64 which are typically deemed 
‘persuasive’ authority by the judiciary. There are, however, manifest 
differences between the Scots law of delict and the English law of torts. Most 
significantly, ‘there is no such thing as an exhaustive list of named delicts in 
the law of Scotland. If the conduct complained of appears to be wrongful, the 
law of Scotland will afford a remedy even if there has not been any previous 
instance of a remedy being given in similar circumstances’.65 In contrast, 
within the Common law system, wherein ‘the creation of a new tort is a bold, 
some would say irresponsible, exercise… to embrace something new within the 
concept of delict is so much easier’.66 
 
57 Zimmermann and Visser, South Africa as a Mixed Legal System, p.3 
58 Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, p.2 
59 Pillans, Delict, para.6.13 
60 MacLean, Autonomy, the Body and Consent in Delict, para.11.79 
61 Brown, Defamation, p.131 
62 Particularly given that the action and remedy of assythment was abolished in 1976 by the Damages 
(Scotland) Act: see s.8 of that Act (since repealed by s.16 of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011, although 
no case has been made that this repeal has revived the action). 
63 Reid, Personality, para.17.12 
64 See Brown, The Scottish Legal System, passim.  
65 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193, at 198 per Lord Ross 
66 Lord Hope of Craighead, The Strange Habits of the English, (Stair Society, 2009), p.317 
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There is thus ‘little historical basis in Scots law for the kind of structural 
difficulties that have restricted English law’.67 Scots lawyers should therefore 
be wary of importing Common law authorities into their jurisprudence, lest the 
character of the Scots law of delict be wholly and irretrievably changed. This 
sense of wariness should be further heighted in respect of areas of law where 
there is conceptual incoherence within the Common law tradition itself. As 
noted in the introduction to this essay, the nature of the tort of ‘false 
imprisonment’ is such that certain learned judges and commentators are of the 
view that it should not be categorised as a ‘trespass to the person’. Rather, it 
appears that it would be better conceptualised as an ‘action on the case’. In a 
jurisdiction such as Scotland, where these terms are meaningless, there is a 
risk that if case law concerning ‘false imprisonment’ is deemed ‘persuasive’ and 
thus received as law, then the structure of the law itself will break down. 
Instead of a principled and rational system, there would be only a pigeonhole 
arrangement of nominate actions. To abandon reason and make it the slave of 
alien precedent would be a retrograde step.  
There is, however, a dearth of native Scots authority on the subject of 
deprivation of liberty effected by private persons. While it is not the case that 
‘wrongful detention by private persons now occurs only rarely’,68 as figures 
from the National Crime Agency in respect of human trafficking bear out,69 it 
is nevertheless the case that private law actions concerning wrongful detention 
are rare.70 It is consequently natural for Scots lawyers to seek guidance from 
the law of other jurisdictions when faced with problems arising from such 
matters. To argue that Scots lawyers should resist the importation of alien 
precedents into their system is not, however, to argue that they should resist 
the use of foreign precedents. Merely, it is to claim that for a foreign precedent 
to be deemed ‘persuasive’ by the Scottish courts it ought to be decided on the 
basis of principles which are consistent with the norms of Scots law. The 
 
67 Reid, Personality, para.17.17; Reid here refers to the position in respect of informational privacy, but 
her point can be generalised.  
68 As suggested by Reid: ibid., para.5.48 
69 See National Crime Agency, National Referral Mechanism Statistics – End of Year Summary 2018 
(published 20/03/2019)   
70 See Brown, Servitude, Slavery and Scots Law, p.371 
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English tort of false imprisonment, with its different history and 
jurisprudential background, is not analogous to the Scots action for the 
wrongful deprivation of liberty and consequently reliance on authorities 
concerning such could potentially introduce conceptual confusion, rather than 
clarity, to Scots law.  
Though geographically distant from one another, South Africa has been 
described as Scotland’s closest legal neighbour. This is due to the fact that 
Scotland and South Africa share a common uncodified Roman-Dutch heritage 
and have each (at various times, to various degrees) been influenced by the 
Anglo-American Common law.71 South Africa has thus been able to build up a 
‘copious and vigorous case law’ concerning the actio iniuriarum72 and, given 
the conceptual and historical similarities between Scots and South African 
jurisprudence, this body of authorities could serve as a fruitful source of 
borrowing for Scottish lawyers.73 There is little question, as there were in 
bygone days,74 of the practical accessibility of such authorities: a great many 
are freely available via the South African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII) 
database. 
In Scotland, ‘since the earliest accounts of the law of reparation, 
infringement of liberty has been regarded as a "delinquence" which requires to 
be compensated’.75 Comparably, in South Africa, ‘it has long been settled law 
that the arrest and detention of a person are a drastic infringement of his basic 
rights, in particular the rights to freedom and human dignity, and that, in the 
absence of due and proper legal authorisation, such arrest and detention are 
unlawful.’76 The South African actions for recovery of solatium in the face of 
wrongful arrest, detention (by private persons) and imprisonment (by state 
officials) is grounded in the actio iniuriarum.77 Though the institutional 
connection to the actio iniuriarum is less clearly articulated in Scotland than 
 
71 Brown, The Scottish Legal System, p.59 
72 Reid, Personality, para.17.12 
73 See Burchell, Personality Rights in South Africa, pp.352-353 
74 See Blackie and Whitty, Scots Law and the New Ius Commune, p.80 
75 Reid, Malice and Police Privilege, p.175 
76 Theobald v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (1) SACR 379 (GSJ), at 389F 
77 Nkosi, Balancing Deprivation of Liberty and Quantum of Damages, p.66 
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in South Africa, in both jurisdictions the deprivation of a person’s liberty is not 
actionable as a tort per se, but rather actionable on the basis of the delictual 
liability arising from interference with the detained person’s dignitary interest 
in their corpus. ‘Borrowing’ principles and authorities from South African 
jurisprudence is, thus, less likely to do structural damage to the Scots law of 
delict than is borrowing from Common law authorities.  
Deprivation of Liberty as Iniuria  
As an action based on iniuria, in any claim for redress following 
deprivation of liberty, the pursuer must be able to prove that they have 
subjectively suffered ‘affront’78 (and so deprivation of liberty is not, logically, 
actionable where the pursuer did not realise that they were detained)79 in 
addition to establishing the objective wrongfulness of the defender’s 
conduct.80 Whether or not conduct is to be understood as ‘objectively wrongful’ 
turns on the question of whether or not said conduct is deemed juridically 
contra bonos mores [contrary to good morals].81 This standard – though 
presented here in the ‘decent obscurity of a learned language’82 – is simply 
analogous to the familiar benchmark of ‘public policy’,83 which is recognised 
as presently permeating the law of delict.84 Although the courts in Scotland 
have not, in recent times, analysed acts amounting to the deprivation of liberty 
effected by private persons within the schema of liability for iniuria, it is here 
submitted that the extant Scots authorities on the subject (such as they exist) 
can be fit neatly within this framework.  
It is said that to succeed in an actio iniuriarum there must be animus 
iniuriandi [intention to injure] on the part of the delinquent.85 To say such has 
been described by Zimmermann, however, as an ‘ahistorical generalisation’.86 
 
78 Le Roux v Dey [2011] 3 SA 274 (CC), para.143 
79 Cf. D.47.10.3.2; see also Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, fn.41 
80 Ibid., para.70 
81 Strauss, Bodily Injury, p.182 
82 Johnston, Res Merae Facultatis, p.141  
83 Strauss, Bodily Injury, p.182 
84 See Pillans, Delict, preface 
85 Erskine Institute, 4.4.80 
86 Zimmermann, Obligations, pp.1059-1061 
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While it is the case that a delinquent must possess animus in order to be 
capable of effecting the delict of iniuria, animus here does not mean simply 
‘intention’ but rather to the broader ability of a person to form an ‘intention’ as 
a matter of law.87 In other words, iniuria cannot be inflicted by one who is 
insane or of nonage.88 It can only be inflicted by one who is capable of 
understanding the wrongfulness of their actions, even if as a matter of 
subjective fact the individual in question does not in fact appreciate the 
wrongfulness of said action.89 Consequently, in spite of what the terminology 
of animus iniuriandi implies, the need be no design to actively cause affront. 
Iniuria may be inflicted by one who affronts the personality interests of 
another through misplaced zeal as much as where one has acted with an 
express design to injure.90 
It is for this reason that in Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust,91 the pursuer’s 
case was permitted to proceed to probation notwithstanding the absence of any 
claim of malice, intention or ‘animus iniuriandi’ on the part of the defenders. 
This ostensible oddity can be rationalised on the grounds that the core of the 
actio iniuriarum is the contumelia displayed by the wrongdoer. Contumelia – 
hubristic disregard of a recognised personality interest – cannot be effected 
through simple negligence, but it is quite apparent that one might recklessly 
disregard another’s rights.92 Hence, conduct might be actionable as iniuria 
where it is unthinking (as where one acts without thinking about the interests 
of others),93 but not where the alleged perpetrator is incapable of thinking.  
An actio iniuriarum thus occurs where a delinquent, who is compos 
mentis, hubristically acts to the subjective and objective affront of another 
 
87 Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, p.40 
88 D.47.10.3.1 (Ulpian)  
89 D.47.10.3.2 (Ulpian); although Ulpian here suggests that one need not be aware of the wrongdoing for 
it to be actionable, in D.47.10.11.1 it is stressed that an actio iniuriarum will not lie where there is 
dissimulation on the part of the ‘victim’.  
90 The paradigm exemplar of such would be where a physician provides medical treatment without the 
consent of, or against the wishes of, their patient. Here, the benevolent intention of the doctor is 
irrelevant; in disregarding the patient’s personality interests, even in the perceived best interests of the 
patient, the physician commits iniuria in the form of assault: see Brown, When the Exception is the Rule, 
p.37 
91 [2006] CSOH 143 
92 See the discussion in Smith, Damn, Injuria, Damn, p.126 
93 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, p.40 
 ISSN 2634-5102  |Page 52 
 
Copyright @ the Author(s)                                                                                                                         CC BY 4.0 
person’s recognised personality interest(s). Liberty, as an interest which falls 
under the ‘higher-level’ category of corpus, is manifestly a recognised and 
protected personality interest. Consequently, affronts to liberty are, in Scots 
law as in South Africa, ‘injurious’ in the technical sense of that term. As such, 
in Scots law the act of hubristically depriving another of their liberty is 
actionable sine damno – that is, without proof of loss. Solatium, rather than 
‘damages’,94 is payable as recognition that a wrong has been committed by the 
delinquent.95 That solatium is payable sine damno ostensibly marks a point of 
similarity with ‘false imprisonment’, but this point of analogy should not be 
stretched too far. An actio iniuriarum does not give rise to liability ‘per se’ in 
the Anglo-American sense. Rather, that solatium is payable sine damno is a 
relic of the history of the actio iniuriarum as a penal delict.96 In recognition of 
the aversion of modern Scots law to private penal remedies, however, solatium 
was ‘effortlessly reinterpreted as being purely compensatory when the time 
came for legal writers to fit the actio iniuriarum into the modern theory of 
Scots delict law’.97 
‘Unlike officials operating under statutory authority, private persons do 
not enjoy any form of privilege and thus malice need not be proved in order to 
establish liability’ for depriving another of their liberty.98 It is sufficient for the 
pursuer to show that the detention was ‘wrongful’.99 This, it is submitted, 
corresponds with the framework of liability based on iniuria; the threshold for 
what amounts to contumelious conduct is lower where one acts without grant 
of legal authority. A police officer or other such state official who infringes the 
liberty interest of a private person does not axiomatically commit a legal 
wrong, for they enjoy a privilege which ordinary persons do not.100 Hence, the 
 
94 ‘Though typically conflated or taken together, [damages and solatium] are conceptually separate: 
damages repair instances of damnum (loss), while an award of solatium affords reparation for non-
patrimonial injury or affront: see Brown, Defamation, p.131 
95 ‘It should be noted that ‘in principle solatium for "hurt feelings" caused by affront based upon the actio 
injuriarium is a different animal to the solatium that can be awarded to a claimant for physical or 
psychiatric injury’: Stevens, para.63 
96 ‘In Scots law, the solatium awarded by courts to the successful claimant under iniuria… was originally 
regarded as being entirely penal’: Descheemaeker, Solatium and Injury to Feelings, p.73 
97 Ibid. 
98 Reid, Personality, para.5.50 
99 Smith v Green (1853) 15 D. 549; MacKenzie v Young (1902) 10 SLT 231  
100 This is not to say that a private person who detains another necessarily commit a wrong: one may 
legitimately act to protect one’s proprietary interest (Bell, Principles, §2032) or where there is ‘moral 
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courts require more than proof of the mere act of detention where the alleged 
wrongdoer is a state official.101 Where the defender is a private person, 
however, the ‘wrongfulness’ of the act will be presumed in the absence of 
vitiating factors.102 In other words, where the alleged delinquent is a state 
official, the onus is on the pursuer to prove that the defender’s conduct was 
positively contra bonos mores. Where the alleged delinquent is a private 
person, it is for the defender to demonstrate that their conduct was not contra 
bonos mores.  
The formal need to demonstrate the objective ‘wrongfulness’ of the act 
complained of marks the modern Scots action for wrongful detention as a child 
of iniuria rather than of strict liability. While in practice the ease with which 
‘wrongfulness’ might be established in cases against private persons, in the face 
of the presumption thereof, is such that one might describe liability for such as 
‘strict’ de facto if not de jure,103 the temptation to categorise wrongful 
detention in this manner should be resisted. To do so would, as occurred in 
respect of the delict of defamation, have a deleterious effect on the coherence 
and rationality of Scots law.104 When faced with novel problems arising out of 
conduct amounting to deprivation of liberty, Scots lawyers should 
consequently avoid looking to Anglo-American precedent. Instead, 
comparative consideration of South African authorities would allow for the 
development of a more coherent and principled framework which is in keeping 
with the spirit of Scots law.  
Conclusion 
The above discussion, as indicated in the introduction, is not mooted as 
a matter of idleness. It is of considerable practical importance given the reports 
 
certainty’ that a crime has been committed: SME, Criminal Procedure, (2002 Reissue), para.101. Such 
considerations are, it is submitted however, a mere vitiation of the general rule that deprivation of liberty 
is contra bonos mores; the wrongfulness of deprivation of liberty, in other words, has to be weighed 
against other public policy considerations, such as those stemming from the law of property or from the 
general proposition that people in society should not commit crimes.  
101 See Whitehouse v Gormley [2018] CSOH 93, para.164. See also Lindsay Relegated No Longer?, 
passim.  
102 See, e.g., Reid, Personality, para.5.54 
103 This position would thus mirror the development of the Scots common law pertaining to defamation: 
See Blackie, Defamation, p.634 
104 See the discussion in Brown, Defamation, passim.  
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of the alleged ‘detention’ of students in their halls of residence in universities 
throughout the United Kingdom. While there exists the possibility that actions 
based on ‘false imprisonment’ might succeed throughout in the UK’s Common 
law jurisdictions, the legal position is conceptually different in Scotland. 
Indeed, as discussed in this essay, that position is so different due to 
fundamental dissimilarities between Common law jurisprudence and the 
Mixed jurisprudence of Scotland that Scots lawyers must be wary of taking any 
‘lessons’ from court judgments concerning the tort of false imprisonment. 
Liability for deprivation of liberty in Scotland is not ‘strict’ and so facts which 
give rise to a right of reparation in the Common law may not necessarily do so 
in Scots law. 
Universities, though (autonomous) public bodies, are private ‘persons’ 
in terms of the law of delict; hence they can sue (and be sued) in their own 
name. Within the context of the subject-matter of this essay, they have no 
special status in private law and nor do their security staff. Hence, university 
employees do not enjoy any privilege to detain private persons; prima facie 
detention effected by university security staff is consequently unlawful. This 
presumption of wrongdoing is rebuttable, however. Provided that the detainer 
can show that their conduct was not contumelious – in other words, that what 
they did was not contra bonos mores, i.e., contrary to public policy – then they 
might escape liability for their actions. In practice, this would be a very difficult 
thing for the detainer to prove, since, any argument to the effect that the ends 
justify the means will not defeat a claim of iniuria. One who hubristically 
infringes the personality interest(s) of another commits a wrong, regardless of 
their subjective benevolent intent. At best, it may be argued that the de facto 
confinement of students who are expected to self-isolate due to their exhibiting 
Covid-19 symptoms is not contra bonos mores, since it is in keeping with 
public policy to prevent the spread of infectious disease.  
  The key practical difference between the law of Scotland and that of the 
rest of the UK lies thus in the fact that for an instance of wrongful detention to 
be actionable in Scotland the pursuer must logically have suffered a 
demonstrable subjective affront. Consequently, evidence that the pursuer was 
not aware of or bothered by the detention, or that they passively and pleasantly 
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acquiesced in it, will not give rise to a right of reparation. This is in contrast 
with the position under the nominate tort of false imprisonment, where a right 
of reparation does arise even if the purported ‘victim’ was unaware of their 
predicament.105 The implications of this distinction in cases of mass detention 
are manifest. While in the Common law, proof that one student has been in 
fact ‘falsely imprisoned’ in their halls of residence would logically mean that 
every other student confined to those same halls would have a right of action, 
in Scotland the onus is on each individual pursuer to demonstrate that they 
knew of and were affronted by the fact of detention.  
Like the Roman jurists, the English judiciary have in the past 
demonstrated a studied ‘ability not to extend conclusions to the point of 
absurdity.’106 Faced with a preponderance of claims for damages from those 
who have suffered no meaningful harm, in circumstances in which the 
deprivation of liberty may be deemed in the ‘public interest’, the English courts 
may rule against recoverability on grounds of public policy, notwithstanding 
the internal logic of the rules pertaining to strict liability. The position in 
Scotland has the potential to be more principled: While the courts may act so 
as to achieve the same practical outcome, by predicating the law pertaining to 
deprivation of liberty upon iniuria as opposed to some strict liability nominate 
action, particular claims may be allowed or denied depending on their own 
merits, without abandoning the internal logic of the law. Here, one is reminded 
of the title of the festschrift for Professor George Gretton: There is Nothing so 









105 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692; Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation Co. Ltd. 
(1920) 122 LT 44, pp.54-55, per Atkin LJ.  
106 Watson, Roman Slave Law, p.25 
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